Posted on July 15, 2009 - by Venik

Talking to Taliban

Coalition losses in Afghanistan continue mounting. Most casualties are sustained when troops are at their bases or on routine patrol missions. Recent reports suggest that the coalition is short on operational helicopters. Available fleets of attack helicopters and ground attack planes are stretched thin providing cover to supply convoys and ground patrols. The overall situation bears a striking similarity to the latter years of the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan: most available troops are busy protecting their own bases.

During the first half of 2008, the number of US troops in Afghanistan was boosted by over 80% to about 48,000. In February of 2009 the new US administration announced that additional 17,000 reinforcements will be heading to Afghanistan. The US commanders in the country requested another 30,000 on top of that. If they get their wish, the US would nearly double its contingent in Afghanistan compared to the Bush years. This “surge” falls in line with the emphasis Obama placed on the war in Afghanistan during his election campaign.

With the possibility of the US increasing its military presence in Afghanistan to nearly 100,000 troops and current contributions from its allies, the coalition may eventually match the size of the Soviet force deployed in Afghanistan at the height of the 1979-1989 campaign. At the time, the Soviet commanders were asking the Kremlin for 250,000 troops but had to make do with less than half the needed force.

A Russian Volga-Dnepr AN-124 long-range heavy transport aircraft takes off from Moffett Federal Airfield, Calif., April 22. The contracted AN-124 transported 129th Rescue Wing deployment cargo to Afghanistan because the high operations tempos of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have kept C-17 Globemaster III and C-5 Galaxy aircraft fully engaged. (U.S. Air Force photo/Master Sgt. Daniel Kacir)

If the past eight years of the US involvement in Afghanistan are anything to judge by, the US technological superiority is not a decisive factor in this war. Compared to the Soviets in the 1980s, the US is at a distinct disadvantage, having to transport troops, weapons, ammunition and other supplies from the other side of the world. I have seen estimates showing that to transport one ton of cargo to Afghanistan the US is spending ten to fifteen times as much as the Soviets.

The new supply route via Russian airspace will allow the US to save as much as $150 million annually in transit costs. On top of that the USAF continues to lease An-124 transport planes from Russia’s “Volga-Dnepr” carrier to lower its costs and extend service life of its C-17 Globemaster and C-5 Galaxy aircraft, holding the dubious distinction of being the world’s most expensive cargo planes – both to acquire and to operate. All of these cost-saving measures, however, are a drop in a bucket compared to the $2 billion the US spends each month on the war in Afghanistan. The cost of the war is likely to grow by at least another billion in the next six months.

With the arrival of fresh troops earlier this year, US and British commanders in Afghanistan launched several reasonably large-scale operations along the Helmand River in an attempt to counter Taliban infiltrations in this area. Taliban responded by attacking coalition supply routes in Pakistan. More than 70% of all coalition supplies in support of the war effort traverse Pakistan every year atop some two thousand trucks. The rest is airlifted at great expense from the west using USAF’s sizable fleet of overpriced and notoriously unreliable long-range transport aircraft.

During his election campaign, Obama made the war in Afghanistan – and its successfull outcome – the cornerstone of his future foreign policy. The news from the front do not bode well for America’s new president. With tens of thousands of troops consumed by a costly stalemate with Taliban and thousands reinforcements en-route to Afghanistan, this war is no longer a forgotten sideshow. The risk of repeating the Iraqi fiasco – still very much in progress – is now more than a remote possibility.

As they say, desperate times call for desperate measures. About a week ago rumors surfaced that the US government may be considering the possibility of a negotiated peace with Taliban. The topic attracted some lively public debate. The optimistic majority reached the consensus somewhere along the lines of “we don’t negotiate with terrorists”. They are still under the impression that the primary reason for the eight years of Afghani teeter-totter is that just “we haven’t tried hard enough”. Surely, if we send another 17,000 troops, or maybe another 30,000, we will nip this pesky Taliban problem in the bud.

Naturally, most assumed that a decision in Washington was all that was needed to bring Taliban to the negotiating table. Few considered that Taliban also does not negotiate with terrorists and that simply saying “alright, okey, lets talk now” is not likely to convince Taliban leaders of our peaceful intentions. The possibility of peace talks with Taliban – however absurd this might have seem even a year ago – maybe little more than wishful thinking on our part. The belated Afghanistan exit strategy will be neither painless nor dignified. I do not see American diplomats sharing refreshments and exchanging witty remarks with their Taliban counterparts somewhere in Switzerland any time soon.

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