Posted on June 3, 2009 - by Venik
Medvedev vs. Putin
A small scandal erupted in Russia’s Karelia region over the decision by a local newspaper to reprint the article from The Vancouver Sun critical of Medvedev. Editors of the Iskra – a small entertainment paper named after Lenin’s famed underground revolutionary newsletter and a relative newcomer to the Russian newspaper market – in a desperate attempt to save their newspaper from from financial ruin just three months after its launch, decided to reprint “Dmitry Medvedev’s underwhelming year as lapdog” by Jonathan Manthorpe – a reporter for Vancouver’s favorite tabloid and the author of the “Forbidden Nation: A History of Taiwan”, of which at least twenty copies were sold.
Preeminence of Mr. Manthorpe on the international periodical scene meant that it took about a month for his article to get noticed in Russia – thanks to Iskra and Lenta.ru, which happily carried the story about the governor of Karelia coming down like a ton of bricks on the heads of Iskra’s hapless editorial staff for disseminating foreign propaganda and insulting the country’s beloved president. Iskra’s attorney told reporters that, according to the Russian law, newspapers do not carry any responsibility for the material reprinted from other publications. Many of Iskra’s corporate sponsors did not share this optimistic view and decided to pull their ads from the paper. While Iskra’s attorney definitely should read that particular law one more time, it is unlikely the paper or its editors are in any serious legal trouble. The newspaper’s biggest enemies right now are not the governor and even not omnipresent Mr. Putin, but Iskra’s creditors.
Reporters in various distant parts of the world, like Vancouver, for example, are still holding the view that Russia’s president is reporting to his prime minister. While entirely inaccurate, this view makes it very easy to write about Russia. Take Jonathan Manthorpe for example, to conclude his brilliant analysis of political currents in the Kremlin, he writes:
“If Medvedev was really president, he would fire prime minister Putin and ask someone else to tackle the job. But he isn’t and won’t.”
It would seem that, according to Manthorpe, for one to be a real president, one needs without delay to fire his vice president or prime minister. Firing the rest of the cabinet would be a further indication of presidential prowess, while dismissing the parliament would no doubt be a mark of a real giant of modern political thought. Jokes aside, what possible motivation would Medvedev have for firing his close colleague and friend of twenty years, not to mention Russia’s by far most favorite political figure and the chairman of Russia’s ruling political party? Just to prove that he’s the man? I don’t know, maybe this is a Canadian thing that I don’t quite grasp.
Since the early nineties Medvedev – an accomplished corporate attorney and a law professor – has been Putin’s closest adviser. For years Putin has been doing what Medvedev advised him to do and not the other way around. In 1999 one of Putin’s first decisions as Russia’s newly-appointed Prime Minister was to bring his buddy Medvedev to Moscow to take up a high-ranking post in the presidential administration. In 2000 Medvedev was placed in charge of Putin’s election campaign. Medvedev occupied powerful positions near the top of the Kremlin’s hierarchy, but not at the very top. He was deputy this and deputy that, making it easy for him to stay influential without attracting too much public scrutiny.
In those days Yeltsin has been changing prime ministers like ties. In less than two years in 1998-1999 Yeltsin went through four prime ministers – Chernomyrdin, Kiriyenko, Primakov, Stepashin – before he plucked Putin from relative obscurity and made him the head of the government. Why did Medvedev drop everything and decided to follow Putin to Moscow? At the time Medvedev had a prospering legal practice and several successful business ventures. Putin did not ask him to come to Moscow out of charity.
Perhaps Medvedev expected to be generously rewarded in some ways now that his buddy was the prime minister? In the preceding months Yeltsin threw out such titans of Soviet and Russian political establishment as Chernomyrdin and Primakov like a pair of worn out boots. Very few among the Russian public and even fewer in the government thought Putin would stick around. Everybody saw Putin as yet another scapegoat for Yeltsin to blame for the country’s 1998 financial meltdown. Putin’s dismissal seemed inevitable. And yet, Medvedev put his personal life and business endeavors on hold and came to Moscow. No matter how you look at it, two things are clear: Putin needed Medvedev to be nearby and Medvedev decided to help at a time when doing so most likely seemed as a very risky idea.
After being elected president, Putin appointed Medvedev to the country’s most economically important post: the chairman of Gazprom’s board of directors. It was on this job that the soft-spoken Medvedev showed himself to be a ruthless and talented executive who cleaned the house and lead Gazprom to an eight-fold increase in capitalization. The question crucial for understanding the relationship between Medvedev and Putin is when exactly did Putin decide that he wanted Medvedev to be Russia’s next president. The answer is: in July of 2006. It was at that time that Medvedev finally stepped out of the shadows to publicly criticize Russia’s powerful minister of defense and leading presidential candidate Sergei Ivanov. Most Russians, myself included, failed to appreciate the significance of that moment and continued regarding Medvedev’s possible presidential aspirations as a lost cause.
Looking at the past twenty years of intertwined careers of Russia’s president and prime minister, there can be no doubt that Medvedev’s convincing and highly effective but civilized and almost friendly attack against what was to be Sergei Ivanov’s presidential campaign platform did not happen without Putin’s knowledge and blessing. At the time the Western press was beginning to speculate that Putin may seek the third term in office, Russia’s president has already decided on his successor.
Medvedev may not be particularly charismatic, but he is likable and creates an impression of a nice, friendly guy – an impression that couldn’t be farther from truth, according to Medvedev’s former Gazprom colleagues. Still, to fight this impression, caused by Medvedev’s baby faced youthful appearance, soft-spoken manner and the image of a college law professor, Putin was a necessary element of Medvedev’s presidential bid. Russia’s public knew little of Medvedev’s Gazprom adventures and until the last few months before the election did not perceive him as a sufficiently strong candidate. With Putin standing behind him, this perception of Medvedev quickly changed, forcing Russian political analysts to scratch their heads.
What was this, an attempt by Putin to play puppeteer for the next four years? This idea was favored by Western journalists seeking a simple explanation to the unexpected turn of events in Russia’s presidential campaign. Even after Medvedev was elected, a number of Western publications continued speculating that if not today then tomorrow Medvedev will resign and Putin will be back. To great disappointment of Russian political experts from the likes of The Vancouver Sun this did not happen. In Russian politics few things are as simple as they seem and they almost never seem simple. If Putin wanted a puppet he certainly would not have supported a presidential bid from a man who is smarter and whose advice Putin followed for so many years. Rule number one of political puppetry: a puppet cannot be smarter than the puppeteer.
Some say Putin did not want the “strong” Ivanov to win presidency. In the distant KGB past Col. Gen. Ivanov was Col. Putin’s superior. In the run-up to the 2008 presidential election those times were ancient history. Ivanov was Putin’s obedient and loyal defense minister. To be any more loyal Ivanov would have had to be Putin’s wife. But if Putin simply wanted a puppet, he had a wide selection of excellent candidates who were neither his long-time friends nor his former KGB commanders. Whenever you study Russian politics and you see something that makes perfect sense you can be absolutely certain that you are wrong.
While Mr. Putin might have been flying in fighter jets, launching cruise missiles from a supersonic bomber, and shooting tigers with tranquilizer darts in Siberia, it was largely Medvedev’s effort that destroyed Yukos and landed its illustrious leader in a Siberian jail. It was Medvedev’s idea to bring back the tanks and ICBMs to the V-Day parade on the Red Square. It was Medvedev’s order that sent thousands of Russian troops pouring across Georgia’s border in August 2008. It was Medvedev who launched the highly controversial military reform the very thought of which scared the hell out of Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and even Putin. And when Russian Army’s GRU intelligence agency criticized the reform, it was Medvedev who sacked its highly influential chief of twelve years.
I was always critical of Putin’s lack of a grander vision of Russia’s foreign policy. It’s not that I much disagreed with what he was doing – it’s the scale of his policies that failed to impress me. Medvedev has no such problem. The primary issue with Medvedev is that he does not fit into the established view of what a Russian law professor should be, causing many Russian and foreign political analysts and journalists to look for an explanation in all the wrong places.
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June 11, 2009
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Thanks, good piece.
I agree with you Venik. The “western” media is totally stupid when it comes to understanding Russian politics and the relation between Medvedev and Putin.
Wrote so a year ago:
http://www.moonofalabama.org/2008/03/dmitry-medvedev.html
http://www.moonofalabama.org/2008/08/putin-rules-doe.html
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