Posted on April 30, 2009 - by Venik

The Road to Afghanistan

The expedient defeat of NATO-sponsored Georgian army last August by the Russians left many hardliners in Washington and Brussels itching to respond. NATO’s decision to break formal contacts with Russia was a testament to NATO’s own political weakness. To add to the Alliance’s humiliation, the economic crisis forced the West to seek improved relations with Russia and NATO had no choice but to try to re-establish contacts. NATO was further embarrassed by Russia’s seemingly successful efforts to shut down the Alliance’s major airbase in Kyrgyzstan that was crucial to its strategy in Afghanistan.

In response, the US and the EU are intensifying their efforts to diminish Russia’s influence in Turkmenistan. The strategy devised by the West is risky and ambitious. The US is deliberately overreacting to Taliban activities in Pakistan. The US Department of State is doing everything possible to present Pakistan as a failed state that is about to collapse and hand its nukes over to Al Quaeda. I mean, holy moly, Taliban is sixty miles from Islamabad. Never mind that Taliban is half that far from Kabul, where thousands of NATO troops are stationed. The hype around Pakistan has been working to a point, but I think Hillary needs to come up with a better explanation for how two thousand lightly-armed Taliban fighters are going to overrun Pakistan’s half-a-million-strong army. I say, if you are going to bullshit, might as well try to make it sound as convincing as possible.

Map of Central Asia

So why does the US need to create an appearance of instability in Pakistan? It is not Pakistan the US is after, but Turkmenistan and its tremendous oil and natural gas resources. Turkmenistan, with its long border with Afghanistan, is absolutely terrified by the possibility of being infiltrated by Taliban fighters. Now in its negotiations with Turkmenistan, he US can point to Pakistan and say “this would not have happened if they asked for our protection”. Turkmenistan is extremely important to the US global foreign policy. Americans are about to lose their primary supply airbase for the Afghan war effort. And yet, they are willing to sacrifice the alternative routs via Pakistan and Russia, just to convince Turkmenistan that its security depends on closer ties with Washington. And, of course, if Pakistan is unstable and Russia is unwilling, this would make it easier for the US to justify having troops manning the Georgia – Azerbaijan – Turkmenistan supply route. All in the name of fighting terrorism, naturally.

The US and the NATO are planning to use one stone to kill not two birds, but an entire flock. By building a new supply route connecting Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan the US enhances its strategic position in Afghanistan; reduces Russia’s influence in Turkmenistan and in Central Asia in general; secures Georgia and Azerbaijan; pressures land-locked Armenia – a key ally of Russia in the region – to cede disputed territories to Azerbaijan in exchange for reopening the border with Turkey; and secures Turkmen natural gas needed to make the Nabucco pipeline project economically-viable, while effectively killing Russia’s South Stream pipeline project and reducing the EU’s dependence on Russian gas.

A part of this strategy is to somehow cause Russia to end NATO’s cargo transit to Afghanistan via Russian territory. Effectively, the US is making its war in Afghanistan hostage to its energy interests in Central Asia. The first attempt by NATO to annoy Moscow by conducting a military exercise in Georgia did not bring the desired results. Russia’s response was rather mild: it canceled a meeting between Russian and NATO military representatives. And so NATO decided to try again by expelling two Russian diplomats from Brussels. Officially, this was in response to uncovering a suspected Russian spy who was a high-ranking member of Estonia’s Ministry of Defense. However, expelling Russian diplomats from Brussels three days ago was a belated and incongruous response. Obviously, the goal here was to provoke a stronger response from Russia. Making sure that the son of Russia’s EU representative was among the expelled diplomats was clearly a part of this strategy to anger Moscow.

The best point about this approach is that however Moscow’s chooses to respond, it will likely advance NATO’s goals. If Moscow’s response is mild, like a quid pro quo expulsion of two Western diplomats, it will be said that Russia is weak; that its economic problems are likely much greater than it admits; that Russia is unable to protect its own interests, let alone the interests of its neighbors; that its army is a paper tiger and all the other usual attacks you would normally see in Washington Post. If Russia’s response is aggressive, it will be once more labeled confrontational and unreliable. And so it will be interesting to see how Russia responds to what it already called a provocation.

America’s grand strategy has one notable hole: Afghanistan. Unable to fight Taliban with existing limited forces and failing to secure significant reinforcements from other NATO members, the US military’s only remaining shot at a decisive victory is to substantially increase its presence in Afghanistan. The only way to do this is to withdraw as many troops as possible from Iraq and to send them to Afghanistan. Thus, it would be to Russia’s benefit if for some reason Americans got delayed in Iraq. Clearly, Turkmenistan will not be too much interested in America’s protection if America is running out of soldiers. And Russia can always point to Georgia as a prime example of what American and NATO protection is really worth.

To win the election, Obama built up the defeat of Taliban to be his supreme foreign policy objective. Apparently, America’s security hinges on who is ruling in Oruzgan province of Afghanistan. Now Obama is risking his Afghanistan strategy to gain Turkmenistan’s trust. This would have been a chancy approach in the best of times. While Obama’s energy independence aspirations are commendable, the sad truth is that US foreign policy was, is, and in the foreseeable future will remain dedicated to securing foreign sources of oil and gas. For its part, Russia will continue to not take seriously any US friendship overtures and NATO’s cooperation proposals. Twenty years ago NATO got the best of Russia in Afghanistan. It is in the Russian nature to always return favors.

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