Posted on February 9, 2009 - by Venik

Russia Stepping on Obama’s Afghan Plans

For nearly eight years Manas International Airport in Kyrgyzstan has been a key element in the US tactics and strategy in Afghanistan. The airport supported a high volume of flights by USAF aircraft, primarily by heavy-lift transports and aerial tankers but also by F/A-18, F-15E, and A-10 ground attack aircraft, as well as by other types of NATO combat planes. The airport was opened to NATO aircraft shortly after the events of September 11, 2001 and Russia fully supported US military deployment to what it considers its “near-abroad” – a zone of special national security and economic interests, a territory comprised of former Soviet republics and former Warsaw Pact members. A few days ago – in a midst of a raging financial crisis -  Russia paid Kyrgyzstan billions of dollars essentially to kick the Americans out.

Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the President of Kyrgyzstan, announced that the airport will be closed to all NATO aircraft and personnel. Bakiyev made no secret of the fact that money played a central role in his decision (currently the US is paying $2 million yearly rent for the Manas base and Kyrgyzstan wants $200 million). He said that the airport was offered to the US in 2001…

“However, then we were talking about one-two years. Eight years have passed. On many occasions we have discussed with the US the issue of financial compensation for the continued military presence at the airport, but we did not find understanding.”

Another reason cited by Bakiyev was the killing of a Kyrgyz citizen – a truck driver – by US military personnel over two years ago. The US officials have been “investigating” the incident and Kyrgyzstan is still waiting for the results of this investigation. According to various polls, public opinion in Kyrgyzstan has been decidedly against the continued use of the airport by the US military. What finally convinced Baliyev to pull the plug on the Americans was the economic crisis and Russia’s offer of substantial financial aid.

Manas Airbase, Kyrgyzstan

Russia agreed to finance the construction of the Kambaratinski hydroelectric plant in the amount of $1.7 billion. Russia also offered Kyrgyzstan a $300 million loan at 0.75% APR for forty years. Additionally, Kyrgyz government will receive a $150 million grant from Russia. Russia will forgive Kyrgyzstan a part of its debt and will accept payments in goods and services. In exchange, Russia will receive 48% of the stocks of the “Dastan” factory (manufactures scientific equipment and naval weapons) and a building the Bishkek – Kyrgyz capital – to be used as a Russian cultural center.

The government of Kyrgyzstan has formally denounced the agreement with the US that allowed the US military to use Manas airport. Kyrgyz constitution requires the country’s parliament to approve or reject denunciation of the agreement. According to statements by some Kyrgyz lawmakers, the US military may be allowed up to six months to gradually shut down operations at Manas and to remove equipment and personnel. Without the Manas base, Obama’s plan to deploy additional fifteen thousand troops in Afghanistan will be much more challenging to implement. Indeed, even supporting the existing contingent in Afghanistan will become problematic without the use of the Kyrgyz airport.

Manas Airbase, Kyrgyzstan

The two alternative routes for NATO troops and supplies go through the two former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.  Since 2001 Uzbekistan allowed the US to transport troops and military cargo to Afghanistan. In 2005, after the Uzbek government harshly suppressed political protests in the capital, the US strongly criticized the Uzbek leadership. In response, Uzbekistan kicked out US military personnel from its territory and closed its airspace to NATO. However, in April of 2008, the president of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov once again offered the US to use the country’s territory to deliver military cargo to Afghanistan. Currently, the US Department of State is in the final stages of negotiations with Uzbekistan.

In the end, efficiency and viability of these supply routes depend on Russia’s good will. Illustrating this fact was the entire point of Moscow’s diplomatic exercise in Kyrgyzstan. Recently Russia offered its territory and airspace for NATO cargo en-route to Afghanistan – a convenient and safe transit route, essential for the new US administration wishing to ramp up operations in Afghanistan. At the same time Russia showed that it expects the US to reciprocate and is not willing to wait for too long. So what do the Russians want in return? Obviously, one of the biggest thorns in Russo-American relations is Washington’s plan to deploy the ABM system in Poland and the Czech Republic.

On more than one occasion Obama expressed his lack of enthusiasm for the ABM project, which led Russia to expect a quick resolution of this issue following Obama’s inauguration. After one month in the White House, Obama was yet to announce his plans regarding the ABM program. The events in Kyrgyzstan is Russia’s way of showing the Americans that time is money and that a decision needs to be made sooner rather than later. Obama is really in a pickle here: cutting the ABM program down to size so early into his term may be perceived as a sign of weakness; but keeping the Russians waiting, as the situation in Kyrgyzstan illustrates, threatens to destroy Obama’s plans to deal with the situation in Afghanistan- one of his key election promises.

In response to Russia’s perceived role in the situation around Manas, Joe Biden recently announced that the US will continue with the ABM program. This is the first real sign of weakness from Obama, who, as it would seem, is conforming his Russian policy to the will of neocon hardliners. Am I jumping to conclusions? Think about this: why did Russia decide to spend nearly $3 billion to shut down Manas base and why did this happen now, when Russia itself needs all the money it can get and when the new US administration appears to be far more willing to cooperate with Russia?

Manas Airbase, Kyrgyzstan

Obama was stalling and the Kremlin decided to force his hand and see what the response would be. Russia wanted to see if Obama can really stand up to hardliners on the Capitol Hill. Apparently he couldn’t, as we see from the ABM announcement by Biden. The US position on ABM is now clear and Russia just saved itself months of being jerked around by the Department of State. Obama bowed to the will of the hardliners, even though doing so caused tremendous damage to one of the cornerstone pledges of his election campaign: to deal with the threat coming from Afghanistan.

Manas base is still operational. Kyrgyz parliament is unlikely to vote on the issue until the end of February. Russia promised to provide Kyrgyzstan with $450 million in low-interest loans by the end of April, so it is likely that the Kyrgyz parliament will delay the vote until the Kremlin at least partially delivers on that promise. This leaves Kyrgyzstan and the US at least a few weeks to talk. Officially, Russia denies that it had anything to do with Kyrgyzstan’s decision to shut down the base. NATO’s Secretary General believes that Russia can convince Kyrgyzstan not to shut down Manas. Kyrgyzstan may close the base to the US (as it declared it would), but leave it open to NATO. This would not be practical from NATO’s perspective, but it will allow Kyrgyzstan to claim that it still supports the war on terrorism.

The US is counting on cooperation of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Unlike Kyrgyzstan, these three nations share a long border with Afghanistan and view Taliban as a common threat. But this is not necessarily good news for the US. Tajikistan is particularly sensitive to the situation in Afghanistan. The concern is that, should the US run out of money or interest and decide to end the Afghan campaign early, Tajikistan can only turn to Russia for protection. Thus, Tajikistan will do what it can to avoid annoying the Kremlin. The US is very far away and Taliban is so uncomfortably close.

Russia wants to keep NATO as far away from its borders as possible. However, Russia has no interest in seeing NATO fail in Afghanistan. Should the US or its NATO allies withdraw from Afghanistan leaving the job half-done, Russia and its CIS allies in the region will have a fun time dealing with Taliban and other fundamentalist influences in the region. This is not what Russia wants. What it wants, simply put, is to control – as much as possible – NATO’s presence and actions in the region and to make sure NATO leaves when the job is done. For Moscow this is a case of when the enemy of your enemy is also your enemy. The situation around Manas gives the White house a kick in the butt and leaves a lot of room for bargaining, which is what Russia might have been after in the first place.

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