Posted on October 23, 2008 - by Venik

Jane’s is Jumping to Conclusions

Reuters ran a story on the recent study by Jane’s Strategic Advisory Services. I have a Jane’s subscription, but I couldn’t find the report on their site and so I will rely on the few passages quoted by Reuters.

“A central problem is that of a Russian political and military leadership commitment to a Cold War scenario. Focus remains on a large army able to deploy overwhelming firepower … There is little demonstrable interest in a smaller, better trained and flexible force… Improvements in command, training levels and the employment of flexible, modern weapons systems are required before the Russian military can face any opponents larger or better equipped than the Georgian military.”

It is true that there is such a commitment. Is it a problem, though? Just a month ago, as Jane’s was compiling its report, the subject of a new Cold War between Russia and the West was dominating world media. Russia’s primary security concern is not with Georgia, but with NATO. Is it really so surprising, therefore, that in its military doctrine Russia places a greater emphasis not on securing its border with Georgia, but on repelling a possible NATO aggression? I think Jane’s analysts need to learn to prioritize.

A smaller, flexible force (like the one Georgia had) sounds great in theory. In practice, however, this approach never worked and, when push came to shove, having enough boots on the ground was always the primary concern for military commanders. A quick response force is needed and Russia is working to create such a force. But, as they say, quantity has a quality of its own and the only thing that beats an armored division is another armored division. This was true in 1941 and it’s still true today.

Improvements in command, training and weapons are a constant requirement and rearmament is a continuous process. I am surprised Jane’s analysts did not know this. Look at any army in the world and you will find the need for training, better command and more effective weapons. This is not the point. In the final analysis, what matters is that in Georgia Russia deployed a force that proved more than adequate against a numerically-superior enemy armed with more modern weapons.

The most widely-used armour was the T-72 main battle tank designed in the 1970s, while there was also a large number of even older T-62s and T-64s. “None of the new T-90s appear to have been present,” JSAS said.

I am not sure if Jane’s is right about T-62s: the few we’ve seen on the photos and in video footage belonged to the Ossetians and Abkhazians. This may come as a surprise to Jane’s analysts, but the T-64 is actually more advanced than the T-72. Numbers can be deceiving, I know. In fact, T-64 – and not the widely-exported T-72 – formed the core of the Soviet armored divisions and served as the basis for future upgrades, such as the T-80.

Russian T-62 in South Ossetia

Very few Russian tank units are equipped with the latest T-90, just as very few USAF units have the latest F-22. This advanced hardware is deployed where it is likely to encounter similarly-advanced opposition: T-90s are deployed in western Russia and F-22s are deployed in Alaska. Deploying T-90s near Georgia would have been just as strange as sending F-22s, say, to Afghanistan. And so, if Jane’s did not notice any T-90s in Georgia, that’s probably a good thing: at least now we know Russian tank generals are not insane.

Georgian T-72BV

Russia deployed a force of about 10,000 soldiers in the first days after the conflict started “suggesting a continued reliance upon mass manoeuvre and fire power with minimal indications of modern weapons,” the report said.

At this point someone should remind Jane’s analysts to read their own reports from June-July period of this year, in which they were describing Georgia’s war preparations. At that time Georgian armed forces numbered 25,000-30,000 personnel. Georgia forward-deployed a massive force around South Ossetia and Abkhazia. All of Georgia’s latest and greatest military hardware was positioned near the two breakaway provinces in preparation for the attack. Sounds to me that Russia’s use of “mass manoeuvre and fire power” was just what the doctor ordered. It certainly worked for them. Perhaps the Russians had a better understanding of the Georgian army than the Jane’s analysts did.

Evidence suggests Russia used “dumb bombs” to attack Georgian targets and that they failed to inflict significant damage. “Russia does not possess a sufficient arsenal of modern precision weapons,” the report said.

And yet, most of Georgia’s stationary and mobile air defenses were destroyed by Russian aircraft. It is true, however, that use of precision-guided air-to-ground munitions by Russia was very limited in the four-day war. The reason for this is not in the absence of a sufficient arsenal, as Jane’s believes, but in the absence of a sufficient number of aircraft capable of carrying such weapons. The operation in Georgia was conducted by the 58th Army almost exclusively using its local resources. The purpose of the 58th Army, stationed in Mozdok and Vladikavkaz, is primarily to deal with fighters in Chechnya and neighboring regions. There is very little use for laser-guided bombs or satellite-guided cruise missiles.

It said a Russian Tu-22 long-range bomber that was shot down over Georgia appeared to have been used for intelligence gathering because of a shortage of unmanned aerial vehicles.

The aircraft shot down over Georgia was not a long-range bomber, but a dedicated reconaissance Tu-22M3R. This aircraft offers reconnaissance capabilities not matched by any UAV currently in service in Russia or elsewhere. Jane’s analysts should have consulted an elevation map of the region to better understand the challenges of flying recon missions from Russia over Georgia using small, divisional-level UAVs. Having said that, Russia does have a pressing need for long-range, high-endurance UAVs and UCAVs and such systems are currently in development by Sukhoi (Zond-series UAVs) and Yakovlev (Yak-130-based UCAV).

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